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Abstract
Privacy concerns have led to the development of privacy-preserving approaches for learning
models from sensitive data. Yet, in practice, even models learned with privacy guarantees can
inadvertently memorize unique training examples or leak sensitive features. To identify such
privacy violations, existing model auditing techniques use finite adversaries defined as machine
learning models with (a) access to some finite side information (e.g., a small auditing dataset),
and (b) finite capacity (e.g., a fixed neural network architecture). Our work investigates the
requirements under which an unsuccessful attempt to identify privacy violations by a finite
adversary implies that no stronger adversary can succeed at such a task. We do so via parameters
that quantify the capabilities of the finite adversary, including the size of the neural network
employed by such an adversary and the amount of side information it has access to as well as
the regularity of the (perhaps privacy-guaranteeing) audited model.
1 Introduction
The success of machine learning algorithms hinges on the availability of large datasets that often
contain sensitive information about participating individuals, thus introducing substantial privacy
risks. One way to minimize these risks is to store less data: providers can methodically consider
what data to collect and how to log it. However, even when such datasets are handled with care
and stored anonymously, user information can still leak through deployed machine learning models
that are trained on anonymous datasets containing hidden correlations with sensitive information.
Indeed, recent works show that “overparameterized” machine learning models have the tendency
to memorize unique training examples and overlearn sensitive attributes [1–9].
These concerns have led to a growing body of research focused on discovering techniques that
provide rigorous privacy guarantees. This, in turn, led to the development of differential privacy
(DP): a mathematically rigorous notion of privacy that prevents such memorization by placing an
upper bound ε on the worst-case information loss [10–12]. However, depending on the application,
a particular choice of ε may give strong or weak privacy guarantees. Moreover, implementations
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of differentially private machine learning algorithms often select large values of ε in order to get
acceptable utility, with little understanding of the impact of such choices on meaningful privacy.
Thus, DP implementations can be complemented by direct measurement of memorization, as in
[2, 7, 13]. Further, while often unrealistic as a threat model, black-box and white-box membership
inference attacks can also be used as a tool to empirically quantify memorization [6, 14,15].
Techniques for quantifying unintended memorization and feature leakage rely on “attacking”
learned machine models via finite adversaries defined as machine learning models with (a) access
to some finite side information (e.g., a small auditing dataset), and (b) finite capacity (e.g., a
fixed architecture such as a neural network with a fixed number of layers and neurons per layer).
When such attacks are successful, one can safely deduce that the audited model has memorized a
user’s unique training example and/or is capable of leaking sensitive attributes [1–9,13]. However,
we cannot certify that a learned model is “privacy-preserving when these attacks fail at finding
privacy violations. This is because it is still possible that a stronger adversary (with larger capacity
and/or access to more side information) can succeed at identifying such violations. In this work,
we identify precise conditions under which an unsuccessful attack by a finite adversary implies that
no (stronger) adversary can perform a successful attack.
1.1 Contributions
We ask the following fundamental question. Assume that a finite adversary with limited capabilities
fails at finding unintended information leakage by a target machine learning model g. Under what
circumstances is it possible to guarantee that no other adversary will succeed at finding (and
exploiting) such a leakage? We consider a general setup that captures many instances of the above
situation. As shown in Section 3, it includes both unintended memorization, where an adversary
would like to infer whether or not the data of a particular individual was used to train g, and
unintended feature leakage, where an adversary would like to learn a sensitive attribute from the
output of g.
To measure the unintended information leakage of a model g, a machine learning auditor designs
a classifier h (referred to as adversary) that attempts to recover sensitive information from g. Ideally,
the modeler would like to ensure that the minimal true loss (minimum under all possible adversaries
h) is large, indicating that no h can reliably recover sensitive information from g. However, such a
quantity cannot be computed in practice because the population distribution is unknown and it is
(computationally) impossible to implement all adversaries. To circumvent this problem, we provide
lower bounds for the minimal true loss over all possible adversaries using the minimal empirical loss
of a two-layer neural network adversary. Our setting differs from classical (PAC) learning settings
in the following three ways: (i) the minimal true loss is defined over all (measurable) functions in
order to account for every possible adversary; (ii) it is desirable for this true loss to be as large
as possible; and (iii) lower bounds for the minimal true loss are sought to guarantee that every
adversary is restricted in its learning. Recall that in classical learning settings: (i) the minimal true
loss is defined over a restricted hypothesis class; (ii) it is desirable for the true loss of the empirical
2
risk minimizer (ERM) to be as small as possible; and (iii) upper bounds on the true loss of the
ERM are sought to guarantee that the ERM loss is close to the minimal true loss for the hypothesis
class.
In order to obtain our main bounds, we combine generalization and function approximation
results from learning theory, along with statistical properties of the two losses we consider: square-
loss and log-loss. It is important to remark that our bounds depend heavily on the Barron constant,
a quantity used to quantify the approximating power of neural networks [16,17].
In a classification setting where g is a linear classifier and the data comes from a multi-
dimensional Gaussian mixture distribution, we provide an integral representation for the minimal
true loss and compute the Barron constant explicitly. In particular, we establish the precise de-
pendency of the Barron constant on the learning model g. We then provide a lower bound for the
minimal true loss using the minimal empirical loss of a two-layer neural network adversary and
the Barron constant. As is typical for large deviation-based generalization results, our bounds are
not tight but they are meaningful in some situations. Indeed, when g is privacy preserving, its
Barron constant is small, which leads to a tight gap between the minimal true loss and the minimal
empirical loss.
1.2 Related Work
There is a wealth of emerging research on model auditing as well as on techniques to evaluate their
strengths via adversarial models and attacks [1–8]. We capture unintended memorization using the
membership inference attacks framework by [6] where the authors determine if a user’s data was
used in the training of an audited model by training an adversarial inference model to recognize
differences in the audited model’s predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus inputs that
it did not train on. We capture unintended feature leakage using the adversarial attack model
by [8, 18, 19] where the authors use an auxiliary dataset (representing side information) to train
an adversarial inference model capable of predicting sensitive attributes from the output of the
audited model.
From a technical perspective, our results rely on generalization and function approximation
results. The latter results characterize how well certain functions can be approximated using
neural networks, see [16, 17, 20–25] and references therein. In particular, our main results heavily
rely on the seminal work of [16] regarding the rate (with respect to the number of neurons) at
which 2-layer neural networks approximate certain functions. Regarding generalization, namely
how different in-sample and out-of-sample errors are, our work relies on classic bounds as those
that can be found, for example, in [26]. More contemporary developments in this topic can be found
in [27–32] and references therein. The work of [29] is closely related to our results under log-loss.
More specifically, we use similar continuity properties for (conditional) entropy where applicable;
however, we rely on more contemporary results in [33].
3
2 Preliminaries
In this section we gather the main notation and results used in this paper. In particular, this
section summarizes classical function approximation results and some continuity properties of the
conditional entropy.
For d ∈ N, we define [d] = {1, . . . , d}. For p ∈ N and x = (x1, . . . , xp) ∈ Rp, we let ‖x‖ =
(x21 + · · ·+ x2p)1/2. In this paper binary variables always take values on {±1}. Hence, by abuse of
notation, we refer to soft classifiers as functions g : Rp → [−1, 1]. For example, logistic regression
classifiers are functions of the form
g(x) = σ(w · x) (1)
where w ∈ Rq, w · x = ∑iwixi and
σ(t) =
1− e−t
1 + e−t
= tanh
(
t
2
)
. (2)
Recall that for a probability distribution P over Rq, α ≥ 1 and measurable function f : Rq → R,
the (P, α)-norm of f is defined as
‖f‖P,α :=
(∫
Rq
|f(x)|αdP (x)
)1/α
. (3)
Also, recall that for a function f : Rq → R, its Fourier transform, say fˆ : Rq → R, is defined as
fˆ(ω) :=
1
(2pi)q/2
∫
Rq
f(x)e−iωxdx. (4)
Let q ∈ N be fixed. For k ∈ N, let Hk be the set of functions h : Rq → R of the form
h(x) = c0 +
k∑
i=1
ciσ(ai · x+ bi), (5)
for some a1, . . . , ak ∈ Rq and b1, . . . , bk, c0, . . . , ck ∈ R. In other words, Hk is the set of functions
that can be implemented using a two-layer neural network with k neurons in the hidden layer.
The following proposition, due to Barron [16], establishes, in a quantitative manner, the universal
approximating capabilities of two-layer neural networks. For a given set K ⊆ Rq, its diameter is
defined as Dia(K) = sup
x,y∈K
‖x− y‖.
Proposition 1. Let k ≥ 1 and P a probability distribution supported over K ⊆ Rq. If h : Rq → R
is a smooth function1, then there exists hk ∈ Hk such that
‖h− hk‖P,2 ≤ Dia(K)Ch√
k
, (6)
1Barron’s theorem holds in greater generality. However, for the purpose of this paper the present formulation
suffices. We refer the reader to [16] for further details.
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where Ch is the so-called Barron constant of h defined as
Ch =
1
(2pi)q/2
∫
Rq
‖ω‖ |hˆ(ω)|dω. (7)
Furthermore, the coefficients of the linear combination in (5) may be restricted to satisfy c0 = h(0)
and
k∑
i=1
|ci| ≤ Dia(K)Ch.
Recall that the total variation distance between two distributions P and Q is defined as
TV(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)|. (8)
For discrete random variables U and V , the conditional entropy (or equivocation) of U given V is
given by
H(U |V ) = −
∑
u,v
PU,V (u, v) log
(
PU,V (u, v)
PV (v)
)
. (9)
The next proposition [33, eq. (7)], establishes the continuity of the conditional entropy with respect
to the total variation distance.
Proposition 2. Let U1, U2 and V1, V2 be random variables supported over finite alphabets U and
V, respectively. If θ := TV(PU1,V1 , PU2,V2) ∈ [0, 1− 1|U| ], then,
|H(U2|V2)−H(U1|V1)| ≤ θ log(|U| − 1) + hb(θ) (10)
where hb(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the so-called binary entropy function.
Due to technical conditions, oftentimes we need to truncate probability distributions. Suppose
that V is a real random variable. For any r > 0, we say that a random variable V ′ is the truncation
of V to the interval [−r, r] if its distribution satisfies that, for all s, t ∈ [−r, r] with s < t,
P(V ′ ∈ [s, t]) = P(V ∈ [s, t])
P(V ∈ [−r, r]) . (11)
3 Problem Setup and Motivation
In this section we introduce a general setup that captures the main features of some machine
learning scenarios where unintended memorization and unintended feature leakage represent an
issue. We first introduce this setup in its full generality, and then we demonstrate that it captures:
(a) unintended memorization via membership inference attacks [6], and (b) unintended feature
leakage [8].
5
3.1 General Setup
Let S ∈ {±1} and U ∈ Rp be two correlated random variables. Assume that upon U , a random
variable T ∈ T is created to form the Markov chain S − U − T . In this work we assume that
either T = [d] for some d ∈ N or T ⊆ Rq for some q ∈ N. As we show in Sections 3.2 and 3.3
below, in applications of interest, S is a (binary) sensitive variable, U is a feature vector, and T is
a representation of the feature vector or the output of a classifier, i.e., T = g(U) for a (potentially
random) mapping g : Rp → T . Our goal is to study the unintended memorization or feature leakage
of g.
Given the vector T , the goal of a learner is to design a mapping h that takes T as input and
produces an estimate of the sensitive variable S as output. For a sample Sn = {(Si, Ti) : i ∈ [n]},
we define the empirical loss of h : T → R as
LSn(h) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(h(Ti), Si), (12)
where ` : R× {±1} → R+ is a given loss function. Similarly, we define the true loss of h as
L(h) := ES,T [`(h(T ), S)] . (13)
We consider both the squared-loss and the log-loss,
`2(sˆ, s) := (sˆ− s)2, (14)
`log(sˆ, s) := −1 + s
2
log(sˆ)− 1− s
2
log(1− sˆ). (15)
We assume that the learner has limited expressiveness and statistical knowledge, i.e., they can
only implement functions in Hk and evaluate the empirical loss LSn . The minimal empirical loss
attained by this finite learner is given by
Lk,Sn := inf
h∈Hk
LSn(h) (16)
In this work, we assume that the learner can in fact minimize LSn over Hk. Ideally, a finite learner
fails to recover the sensitive variable S from the vector T when Lk,Sn is large. Of course, large
depends on the specific loss function and application.
Observe that the true loss of any learner, independent of their expressiveness and statistical
knowledge, is lower bounded by
L := inf
h
L(h), (17)
where the infimum is over all (measurable) functions h : Rq → R. In Section 4 we prove that, under
certain conditions,
Lk,Sn − L ≤  (18)
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for some small  that depends on k and n. Thus, if Lk,Sn is large, then L is large as well. In other
words, an unsuccessful attempt by a finite learner to reliably infer the sensitive variable S implies
that in fact no learner can succeed at such a task. Before establishing (18) rigorously, we show
how the present setup captures some machine learning settings where unintended memorization
and feature leakage are an issue.
Remark. It is worth to point out that Lk,Sn is the empirical loss attained by the empirical risk
minimization (ERM) rule over Hk, see (16). Nonetheless, opposed to typical learning settings, L
is not the minimal true loss over the hypothesis class Hk, i.e, inf
h∈Hk
L(h). Instead, L is the minimal
true loss over every measurable function, see (17). This enlargement of the hypothesis class takes
into account that other learners could have better expressiveness capabilities, hence being able
to implement functions beyond Hk. It is also worth to remark that, opposed to typical learning
settings, we are interested in using the minimal empirical loss Lk,Sn to produce a lower bound for
the minimal true loss (although over an enlarged hypothesis class). As explained before, in this
way the failure of a finite learner implies the failure of any other learner independently of their
expressiveness and statistical capabilities.
3.2 Unintended Memorization
Consider a membership inference attack where the goal of an attacker, the learner in the notation of
Section 3.1, is to predict if the data of a given individual was used to train a target classifier g. To
be more specific, we consider a membership inference attack composed by the following elements.
Population data. Fix a population size N ∈ N. We encode the population data in an
N × (p+ 1) matrix
D =

x1 y1
...
...
xN yN
 , (19)
where xi ∈ Rp and yi ∈ {±1} for each i ∈ [N ]. The variables xi and yi are the feature vector and
the label of the i-th individual, respectively.
Classifier. In the literature, there are two main types of attacks: black-box and white-box.
In black-box attacks, it is assumed that we are given access to a binary classifier g : Rp → [−1, 1]
only through the values of g for some inputs x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rp. In white-box attacks, it is assumed
that we are given access to g itself. For example, when g is implemented by a neural network, a
white-box attack requires knowing the weights of the neural network, while a black-box attack only
requires being able to evaluate g for some inputs. In both cases, the classifier g is trained using
some of the individual records in D. We encode which records were used to train g via a vector
(s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ {±1}N . Namely, we set si = 1 if and only if (xi, yi) was used to train g.
Attacker. Given the data (xi, yi) of the i-th individual and the confidence value g(xi), the
attacker’s goal is to learn the membership variable si. In other words, the attacker wants to learn
whether the data of the i-th individual was used to train g or not. The attacker achieves this goal
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by designing a function h : R→ R which ideally satisfies that
h(g(xi)) ≈ si. (20)
Following our standing assumptions, we assume that the attacker is capable to implement functions
in Hk for some k ∈ N and can minimize LSn over Hk where
Sn :=
{
(sij , g(xij ) : j ∈ [n]
}
, (21)
for some i1, . . . , in ∈ [N ]. Observe that this setting is supervised as the membership variables
si1 , . . . , sin are known. Although supervised attacks might not be the most common ones in the
literature, oftentimes attacks rely on techniques that emulate a supervised setting, see, e.g., ’shadow
models’ in [6].
Observe that the described membership inference attack falls into the general setup presented
earlier. Namely, for a given i ∈ [N ], we let
S = si, U = (xi, yi) and T = g(xi).
In this scenario, our main results provide conditions to guarantee that the failure of certain finite
attackers implies that no attacker can succeed, independently of expressiveness and statistical
knowledge.
3.3 Unintended Feature Leakage
Consider a classification setting where the goal is to predict a label Y ∈ [d] given a feature variable
X ∈ Rp. Furthermore, assume that there is a protected variable Z ∈ {±1} which should not be
used for classification purposes, e.g., gender. Despite not taking the protected variable as input, a
predictor Yˆ = g(X) with g : Rp → [d] might still be biased by the protected variable Z due the
potential dependency between Z and the feature variable X.
A possible goal of a model auditor, the learner in the notation of Section 3.1, could be to
determine whether or not the predictor Yˆ = g(X) unintentionally leaks or rely on the protected
variable Z, i.e., determine whether there is statistical dependency between Yˆ and Z. We remark
that this framework is typical in the fairness literature, where a vast array of notions of fairness
have been proposed based on the statistical dependency of Yˆ and Z (see, for example [34] and
the references therein). For example, a predictor Yˆ is said to satisfy demographic parity if Yˆ is
independent of the protected variable Z. In this context, a model is audited to estimate the degree
of dependence between the predictor Yˆ = g(X) and the protected variable Z.
Note that the described model auditing could be framed into the general setup presented above
by letting
S = Z, U = X and T = g(X).
In this scenario, our main results provide conditions to guarantee that the failure of an auditor in
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detecting dependency between the predictor and the sensitive variable implies that the predictor is
indeed unbiased.
Remark. Although we focused on membership inference attacks and feature leakage, the
general setup introduced in this section captures other machine learning scenarios where privacy
represents an issue, for example, [2, 7].
4 Main Results
Recall that we are given S − U − T where S ∈ {±1}, U ∈ Rp and T ∈ T with T = [d] or T ⊆ Rq.
We now present our main results that establish (18) quantitatively. We start with the case T ⊆ Rq,
which we call the representation setting, and continue with the case T = [d], which we call the
classification setting. The former setting captures the situation where, upon U , a continuous-
valued representation T is created; while the latter setting captures the situation where, upon U ,
an estimate T = Yˆ is created.
4.1 Representation Setting
The next theorem is our main result for the representation setting (T ⊆ Rq). Recall that the
diameter of a set K ⊆ Rq is defined as Dia(K) = sup
x,y∈K
‖x− y‖.
Theorem 1. Let T ⊆ Rq and f+ : T → R (resp. f−) be the conditional density of T given S = +1
(resp. −1). Assume that (a) f− and f+ have the same support, say K, (b) K is compact, and (c) the
function f−/f+ extends smoothly to an open set containing K. If δ > 0, then, for the squared-loss
`2 and all k, n ∈ N, with probability at least 1− δ,
Lk,Sn − L ≤ C0
√
log(1/δ)
2n
+
C1
k
+
C2√
k
, (22)
where C0, C1, C2 are constants independent of k and n.
Moreover, for any smooth function η : Rq → R such that, for all t ∈ K,
η(t) =
λf+(t)− λf−(t)
λf+(t) + λf−(t)
, (23)
with λ = P(S = 1) and λ = P(S = −1), we have that
C0 ≤ (2 + Dia(K)Cη)2, C1 ≤ (Dia(K)Cη)2 and C2 ≤ 4Dia(K)Cη, (24)
where PT is the distribution of T and Cη is the Barron constant of η defined in (7).
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆ := Lk,Sn −L and h∗ ∈ arg minh L(h) where the infimum is taken
over all measurable functions h : T → R. For the squared-loss `2(h, (T, S)) = (h(T )−S)2, we have,
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for all t ∈ K,
h∗(t) = E(S|T = t) = λf+(t)− λf−(t)
λf+(t) + λf−(t)
. (25)
By the assumed hypotheses, there exists an integrable function η : Rq → R that smoothly extends
h∗, i.e, η(t) = h∗(t) for all t ∈ K. Since η = h∗ over K, the support of the distribution of T , we
have that L(h∗) = L = L(η). Furthermore, since |η(t)| ≤ 1 for all t ∈ K, we have that
‖η‖PT ,2 ≤ 1. (26)
By Barron’s theorem (Prop. 1), there exists ηk ∈ Hk such that
‖ηk − η‖PT ,2 ≤
Dia(K)Cη√
k
. (27)
Moreover, if we let
ηk(t) = c0 +
k∑
i=1
ciσ(ai · t+ bi), (28)
the coefficients c0, . . . , ck can be taken such that c0 = η(0) and
∑
i |ci| ≤ Dia(K)Cη. Observe that
|η(0)| ≤ 1 and hence
‖ηk‖∞ := sup
t∈Rq
|ηk(t)| ≤ 1 + Dia(K)Cη. (29)
By the minimality of Lk,Sn := infh∈Hk LSn(h),
∆ ≤ LSn(ηk)− L(ηk) + L(ηk)− L(η). (30)
Observe that (S− ηk(T ))2 ≤ (1 + ‖ηk‖∞)2. By (29), a routine application of Hoeffding’s inequality
implies that, with probability at least 1− δ,
LSn(ηk)− L(ηk) ≤ (2 + Dia(K)Cη)2
√
2 log(1/δ)
2n
. (31)
Under the square-loss `2, it could be proved that for any two functions f1, f2 : Rq → R,
|L(f2)− L(f1)| ≤ ‖f2 − f1‖(2 + 2‖f1‖+ ‖f2 − f1‖), (32)
where the norms are (PT , 2)-norms. Thus, by plugging (26) and (27) in (32),
|L(ηk)− L(η)| ≤ Dia(K)Cη√
k
(
4 +
Dia(K)Cη√
k
)
. (33)
By plugging (31) and (33) in (30), the theorem follows.
Although the conditions of the previous theorem might seem restrictive, they could be easily
guaranteed by adding a small-variance noise to T and then truncating the result. Indeed, if γ > 0
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and Z ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of (S, T ), then (S, T ′) satisfy the hypotheses of the previous
theorem with T ′ being the truncation of T + γZ to the interval [−r, r] for any r > 0.
The assumptions of Theorem 1 guarantee the existence of a function η as in (23). However,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it unknown how to find the function η that produces the
smallest Cη.
Remark. While the right hand side of (22) decreases when k increases, note that Lk,Sn also
decreases when k increases. In fact, if k ≥ 2n, then a two-layer neural network with k neurons can
memorize the entire sample Sn, leading to a trivial lower bound for L as Lk,Sn = 0. Furthermore,
Lk,Sn becomes harder to find when k increases. Overall, this reveals that finding the k that produces
the best bound in (22) is a non-trivial task.
In Section 5 we apply Theorem 1 to a simple mixture model. There we show the utility of (22)
despite the challenges of computing Cη.
4.2 Classification Setting
In the classification setting (T = [d]), the set of all (measurable) functions h : [d]→ [−1, 1] can be
identified with [−1, 1]d via h ∼ v if and only if h(i) = vi for all i ∈ [d]. In this case, expressiveness is
not an issue as functions can be easily stored as vectors. For the rest of this section, we assume that
the learner can implement any function h : [d]→ [−1, 1]. The next theorem provides a quantitative
version of the bound in (18) for the squared-loss `2. For ease of notation, we denote inf
h:[d]→[−1,1]
by
inf
h
.
Theorem 2. If δ > 0, then, for the squared-loss `2 and all n ∈ N, with probability at least 1− δ,
inf
h
LSn(h)− inf
h
L(h) ≤ 2
√
2 log(1/δ)
n
. (34)
Proof. For ease of notation, let h∗ ∈ arg minh L(h). By the minimality of infh LSn(h), we have that
inf
h
LSn(h)− inf
h
L(h) ≤ LSn(h∗)− L(h∗). (35)
For the functions under consideration, the squared-loss `2 is upper bounded by 4. Hence, Hoeffding’s
inequality implies that, with probability at least 1− δ,
LSn(h
∗)− L(h∗) ≤ 2
√
2 log(1/δ)
n
. (36)
The result follows.
Remark. Although our bounds do no depend on d, the size of the alphabet T , the complexity
of the optimization infh does grow with d.
The next theorem provides a quantitative version of the bound in (18) for the log-loss `log.
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Theorem 3. If δ > 0, then, for the log-loss `log and all n ≥ 4(2d + log(1/δ)), with probability at
least 1− δ,
inf
h
LSn(h)− inf
h
L(h) ≤ hb
(√
2d+ log(1/δ)
n
)
, (37)
where hb(x) := −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the so-called binary entropy function.
Proof. For ease of notation, let ∆ be the left hand side of (37). For the log-loss `log, it could be
verified that
inf
h
L(h) = H(S|T ), (38)
see, e.g., Section 2.2 in [19]. Indeed, (38) is attained by the function h∗(t) = 12 [1 + E(S|T = t)].
Similarly, it can be shown that
inf
h
LSn(h) = Hˆ(S|T ), (39)
where Hˆ(·) is the plug-in estimate of H(·). Hence,
inf
h
LSn(h)− inf
h
L(h) ≤ |Hˆ(S|T )−H(S|T )|. (40)
The large deviation bound in Theorem 2.1 in [35] shows that, with probability at least 1− δ,
TV(PˆS,T , PS,T ) ≤
√
2d+ log(1/δ)
n
≤ 1
2
, (41)
where PˆS,T is the empirical distribution of S and T . Thus, (40) and the inequality by Alhejji and
Smith (10) imply that, with probability at least 1− δ,
inf
h
LSn(h)− inf
h
L(h) ≤ hb(TV(PˆS,T , PS,T )). (42)
By plugging (41) in (42), the result follows.
Remark. Note that in the representation setting (T ⊆ Rq) under the squared-loss `2, L is
equal to the minimum mean square error (MMSE) of S given T . Similarly, observe that in the
classification setting (T = [d]) under the log-loss `log, L is equal to the equivocation (conditional
entropy) of S given T , see (38). This highlights the operational interpretation of both losses.
5 Applications and Numerical Experiments
We now consider a specific learning setting and apply Theorem 1 to illustrate the usefulness of our
main results. By explicitly computing Cη, we show the dependency of the Barron constant on the
different elements of the problem.
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5.1 Setting
Assume that S is a Rademacher random variable, i.e., P(S = 1) = P(S = −1) = 1/2, and U ,
conditioned on S, is a Gaussian random vector N (Sv0, Ip) for some unit vector v0 ∈ Rp. We
further assume that T is the truncated output of a linear classifier determined by a unit vector
v ∈ Rp, i.e., T is the truncation of 〈U, v〉 to the interval2 [−3, 3]. Hence, T conditioned on S
is a truncated Gaussian random variable N (Sµ, 1) where µ := 〈v, v0〉. By the symmetry of the
Gaussian distribution, it could be verified that, for all t ∈ [−3, 3],
f±(t) =
e−(t∓µ)2/2√
2pi[Φ(3 + µ)− Φ(−3 + µ)] , (43)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian distribution. In order
to use the upper bound in (22), it is necessary to compute Cη as introduced in (23).
5.2 Computation of Barron’s Constant
A direct computation shows that we can take η : R→ R as
η(t) =
e−(t−µ)2/2 − e−(t+µ)2/2
e−(t−µ)2/2 + e−(t+µ)2/2
=
1− e−2µt
1 + e−2µt
= tanh(µt). (44)
A direct computation shows that η′(t) = µ sech(µt)2. Recall that F(h′)(ω) = iωF(h)(ω), and hence
Cη =
1√
2pi
∫
R
|F(η′)(ω)|dω (45)
=
µ√
2pi
∫
R
|F(sech(µ·)2)(ω)|dω. (46)
Using contour integration, it can be shown that
F(sech(·)2)(ω) =
√
pi
2
ω csch
(pi
2
ω
)
, (47)
which is non-negative for all ω ∈ R. By applying the Fourier inversion formula to (46), we conclude
that
Cη = µ sech(0)
2 = 〈v, v0〉. (48)
Remark. Let gv : Rq → R be the linear classifier gv(u) := 〈u, v〉. Recall that, up to an
immaterial truncation, T = gv(U) and U |S ∼ N (Sv0, Ip). Hence, (48) shows the dependency of
the Barron constant Cη on the linear classifier gv and the statistical dependency of S and U .
2Recall that if Z ∼ N (0, 1), then P(|Z| > 3) < 3× 10−3. Hence, the proposed truncation is almost immaterial.
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5.3 Theoretical Guarantees
By (48), the upper bound in (22) becomes
Lk,Sn − L ≤ 2(1 + 3〈v, v0〉)2
√
2 log(1/δ)
n
+
36〈v, v0〉2
k
+
24〈v, v0〉√
k
, (49)
as K = [−3, 3]. Observe that if v is parallel to v0, the linear classifier gv has the potential to leak
sensitive attributes, whereas if v is orthogonal to v0, then gv avoids learning the sensitive attribute
as long as the finite learner (attacker, model auditor, adversary, etc) fails in such a task. Our
numerical experiments illustrate the validity of this assertion.
It could be verified that, for the squared-loss `2, L ≤ 1. Indeed, the function h0 ≡ 0 attains
L(h0) = 1. Moreover, it can verified that L = 1 if and only if S and T are independent, which in
the context of this experiment is equivalent to have µ = 〈v, v0〉 = 0. Therefore, a learner with finite
expressiveness and statistical capabilities fails whenever Lk,Sn is close to 1. For µ small enough, the
right hand side of (49) is also small, which implies that a learner with arbitrary expressiveness and
statistical capabilities will fail if the finite learner fails. In the present context that would imply
that the output of the linear classifier gv reveals little information about S.
5.4 Numerical Results
In this experiment we assume that the learner has a dataset Sn = {(Si, Ti) : i ∈ [n]} with n = 105
i.i.d. samples drawn from (S, T ) as specified in Section 5.1. The learner adopts a two-layer neural
network with k = 103 neurons in the hidden layer, as formulated in (5). Using the sample and this
neural network architecture, the learner searches for the model, say h˜k ∈ Hk, that produces the
least empirical `2-loss during training. Then, the learner approximates Lk,Sn by LSn(h˜k). Observe
that h˜k should be a minimizer of LSn in order to have Lk,Sn = LSn(h˜k). Although it is known
that finding the ERM rule is, in general, an NP-hard problem [36], in the present context it is
reasonable to assume that LSn(h˜k) is a good approximation for Lk,Sn provided that the two-layer
neural network is trained exhaustively.
Recall that for the squared-loss, the optimal prediction rule for the true loss is the conditional
mean η(t) = E(S|T = t) given in (44). Therefore, the minimal true loss is given by
L =
√
2√
pipµ
∫ 3
−3
e−(t+µ)2/2
1 + e−2µt
dt, (50)
where pµ := Φ(3 + µ)− Φ(−3 + µ).
Given δ = 0.01, (49) provides the lower bound for the minimal true loss
Lk,Sn −
(
2(1 + 3µ)2
√
2 log(100)
n
+
(6µ)2
k
+
24µ√
k
)
≤ L (51)
where the inequality holds with probability no less than 1− δ = 0.99.
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Figure 1: Plot of the minimal true loss L, the minimal empirical loss Lk,Sn and the lower bound
for L given by Theorem 1 with δ = 0.01, k = 103 and n = 105.
In Fig. 1, we plot the minimum true loss L in (50), the minimum empirical loss Lk,Sn and the
lower bound in (51) for each µ ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1}. The minimum empirical loss is
approximated by LSn(h˜k) where h˜k is the model with the least empirical loss over hundreds of
well-trained models3. From Fig. 1, we observe that (i) the minimal empirical loss is very close to
the minimal true loss, and therefore, a two-layer neural network is strong enough for truncated
Gaussian mixture data and linear classifiers; (ii) the lower bound for the minimal true loss is about
89%− 97% of the minimal empirical loss. Therefore, a large minimal empirical loss for the simple
two-layer neural network learner indicates that the the minimal true loss for an arbitrarily strong
learner is still large and the protection of the sensitive variable is guaranteed.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provided conditions to guarantee that if a learner with limited expressiveness and
statistical capabilities fails to learn a sensitive attribute, then no other learner will succeed. We
have also shown through numerical experiments that our main results are meaningful for linear
classifiers and data from a Gaussian mixture distribution. In this context, we theoretically found
the dependency of the Barron constant on both the classifier and the data distribution. Overall,
this work is a step towards model auditing with theoretical guarantees.
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